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Realising the Potential of General Population Research to Reconceptualise the study 
of “Delusions”:   
From Normalising “Psychosis” to De-Familiarising “Normality” 
 
 
The rise of Cognitive Behaviour Therapy for Psychosis, normalisation and the 
continuum model of psychosis 
 
Philosophy … sees the familiar as if it were strange and the strange as if it were 
familiar.  … It rouses us from our native dogmatic slumber and breaks up our caked 
prejudices. 
 
(James, 1911, p.7) 
 
Since the 1990s cognitive behavioural approaches to “psychosisi” have become 
increasingly well-established and are now commonly referred to as Cognitive Behaviour 
Therapy for Psychosis (CBTp).  By 2005 CBTp was recommended in national practice 
guidelines in Australia and New Zealand, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the US (Gaebel et al., 2005).  CBTp takes a “symptom-
based” approach (e.g. Hagen et al., 2010) focusing on psychiatric constructs like 
hallucinations or delusional beliefs given the poor validity, reliability and utility of the 
heterogeneous diagnostic category of schizophrenia (e.g. Boyle, 2002), a category which 
has been increasingly eschewed in favour of the broad construct of “psychosisii” (Boyle, 
2013).  It adopts a continuum model of psychosis as suggested by American psychiatrist 
John Strauss (1969) who reported that, when completing diagnostic rating scales for 
delusions or hallucinations with people in a research study, there was a quantitative rather 
than a qualitative difference – such experiences differed from normal experience only in 
terms of degree.  As a result, a key aspect of CBTp is the “normalisation” of such symptoms, 
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viewing their origins as lying in normal experience and assuming that the principles of 
“normal” as opposed to a necessarily “abnormal” psychology can be used to understand 
them and guide psychotherapeutic intervention (Dudley et al., 2007).  A normalising 
approach was a “strongly endorsed aspect” of CBTp identified in a Delphi study of its key 
components (Morrison & Barratt, 2010, p.138) and this was reflected in five of the six key 
therapist assumptions it identified including four of relevance to this article: 
 
• Therapists ought to view most symptoms of psychosis as quite common in the 
normal population  
• Therapists should believe that many people experience psychotic-like symptoms 
without feeling distressed by them  
• Therapists should believe that it is not the hallucination or the delusion per se that is 
clinically relevant but the amount of distress or disability associated with it  
• Therapists ought to believe that delusions can be quite understandable  
 
(Morrison & Barratt, 2010, p.140) 
 
CBTp practitioners and researchers justify both the continuum model and 
normalisation by referring to a range of clinical and non-clinical empirical studies -- largely 
conducted by cognitive behavioural researchers -- which, I argue, forms a coherent 
“normalising” research programme.  Given the increasing importance of CBTp, I critically 
interrogate this programme, beginning with a brief overview, showing how it has mounted an 
effective empirical challenge to traditional psychiatric assumptions that ostensibly delusional 
beliefs are relatively rare in the general population, qualitatively different from “normal” 
beliefs and un-understandable.  However, I will go on to argue that the potential of this 
research programme to fundamentally reconceptualise the construct of delusional belief has 
been hampered by six limitations identified by a range of critical work:  the tendency to use 
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medicalising and pathologizing terminology, its neglect of the social, interpersonal, 
discursive and cultural contexts of belief and a failure to consider issues of epistemic 
injustice.  I outline an alternative programme of general population research, based on the 
importance of social norms in identifying beliefs as delusional.  I propose that studying the 
lived belief narratives of members of unconventional belief communities might offer a 
necessary corrective to the “clinician’s illusion” bias (Cohen & Cohen, 1984), enabling “non-
clinical” research to more fully realise its potential to change the way we understand beliefs 
considered “delusional.”  Drawing again, on a range of critical and related work, I then 
present alternative research questions and study designs which would avoid each of the 
normalising research programme’s limitations.  Finally, I acknowledge the limitations of this 
alternative programme and briefly discuss it in the context of other approaches like the 
Hearing Voices Movement. 
The focus here on the implicit assumptions of taken-for-granted constructs and 
methods is informed by previous work drawing on traditions of deconstruction, social 
constructionism and post-Structuralism (e.g. Boyle, 2002; Harper, 1994, 1996, 2011; Heise, 
1988; Georgaca, 2000, 2004; Parker et al., 1995).  Following Boyle (2002, p.271), the term 
“belief” will be used simply to mean “a persistent claim that such and such is the case”.  
Throughout, when I describe participants or samples as “clinical” or use the term “service 
user” I am referring to people who have used mental health services as either an in-patient 
or out-patient, often having been given a psychosis-related psychiatric diagnosis.  
Describing participants or samples as “non-clinical” or “general population” indicates that 
these are people recruited from community samples rather than via mental health services 
on the basis of a psychiatric diagnosis. 
 
Seeing “the Strange as if it Were Familiar”:  The General Population, the Continuum 
Model and the “Normalising” Research Programme  
Studies within the normalising research programme can be differentiated into three 
broad, though overlapping, methodological approaches: epidemiological studies of 
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prevalence; comparing clinical samples with non-clinical analogues; and using “normal” 
theoretical processes based on general population research to render intelligible service 
users’ beliefs which are seen as delusional. 
 
Challenging Assumptions About the Rarity of “Delusional” Belief:  Epidemiological 
Prevalence Studies of the General Population 
In the first approach, researchers use structured diagnostic interviews or psychometric 
measures to study the prevalence of delusional beliefs in large general population samples.  
A good example is the study by van Os et al (2000) where trained staff conducted interviews 
with 7,076 randomly selected adults in the Netherlands at their homes with some followed 
up by telephone interviews by psychiatrists.  They reported that 3.3% of the sample met all 
the criteria for delusions whilst a further 8.7% had delusions which were not associated with 
distress and did not require intervention, much higher than might be presumed by 
prevalence rates for diagnostic categories like schizophrenia, with which delusions are 
commonly associated. 
Whilst van Os et al (2000) focused primarily on the presence or absence of symptoms 
using diagnostic interviews, some studies use self-report methods like the Peters et al 
Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 2004) which assesses not only the presence of a 
belief but also the levels of conviction, preoccupation and distress associated with it.  These 
methods are informed by multi-dimensional approaches to the definition of delusion (e.g. 
Oltmanns, 1988) which attempt to address the deficiencies of standard psychiatric 
definitions. The PDI consists of items from the Present State Examination (Wing et al. 1974) 
rephrased to be less stigmatising and thus more acceptable to a general population sample -
- for example “do you ever feel as if you are being persecuted in some way?” 
Using a 21-item version of the PDI, Peters et al (2004) compared a UK sample of 444 
people from the general population with 33 in-patients with psychosis diagnoses whose 
beliefs were judged to be “delusional”.  The mean number of PDI items endorsed by the 
inpatient group (11.9) was significantly higher than that of the general population sample 
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(6.7) and the inpatient group had significantly higher scores on the measures of distress, 
preoccupation and conviction.  However, in terms of number of belief items endorsed, the 
non-clinical group’s scores were normally distributed, albeit skewed to the left, and there 
was considerable overlap between the two groups:  11% of the non-clinical participants had 
scores higher than the mean score of the clinical group. Peters et al (2004) concluded that 
what differentiated the clinical and non-clinical groups was not necessarily the content of 
beliefs but the dimensions of distress, conviction and preoccupation.  Findings like these and 
those of van Os et al (2000) provide empirical justification for the first three of the CBTp 
therapist assumptions noted in the introduction.  Freeman’s (2006, p.202) review of non-
clinical studies like these concluded that “delusional ideation, delusions, and clinically severe 
delusions” were “on a continuum, but its exact form requires further study”. 
However, in a review critiquing such studies from a phenomenological psychiatry 
viewpoint, Heilskov et al (2020) argue that some self-report measures may result in “false 
positives” because they fail to capture what they regard as essential qualities of delusional 
beliefs like context and reasoning.  Responding to similar arguments, Bentall (2015), has 
suggested that such critics tend to adopt an uncritical approach to the construct of 
schizophrenia and to under-emphasise the complexity and varied range of beliefs and 
experiences in the general population, for example those who have intense religious and 
spiritual experiences.  This brings us to the second broad approach which has attempted to 
explore similarities and differences between the beliefs of people with these kinds of 
experiences and those of clinical samples.  
 
Challenging Assumptions That “Delusional” Beliefs are Qualitatively Different:  
Comparing Clinical Samples and Non-Clinical Analogues Along Dimensions of Belief 
Whereas Peters et al (2004) compared a clinical sample with a large general 
population sample, some studies have utilised an analogue methodology, comparing clinical 
groups with sub-groups of the general population whose beliefs are presumed, on 
theoretical grounds, likely to share some phenomenological features of beliefs considered 
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delusional.  On the basis of previous research like the seminal study by Jackson and Fulford 
(1997), Peters et al (1999, p.85) hypothesised that there might be similarities between 
“culturally idiosyncratic psychotic states and culturally validated mystical states”.  Using an 
earlier 40 item version of the PDI they compared a clinical sample (described as “deluded, 
psychotic in-patients”) with four non-clinical samples:  Christian, non-religious and Hare 
Krishnas and Druids – two New Religious Movements (NRMs).  This term, from the 
sociology of religion, refers to groups which are “new” in that they emerged after the Second 
World War and “religious” in that they offer a religious or philosophical worldview or claim to 
provide the means by which some higher goal might be attained (Barker,1996).  Compared 
with the other three non-clinical samples, those in the NRMs scored higher on all the 
parameters except ratings of distress.  The authors reported that, whilst the NRM groups did 
not endorse as many “florid” items on another scale as the clinical sample, they could not be 
differentiated from the clinical participants either on the total number of PDI items endorsed 
or on ratings of conviction though they were significantly less distressed and preoccupied by 
their beliefs.  There were no differences between the Christian and non-religious groups, 
suggesting that the presence of religious belief in itself could not explain the high ratings of 
the NRM samples.  Studies like these appear to indicate that simply holding a belief which 
others find unusual is not inherently pathological (i.e. distressing or problematic) – evidence 
warranting the second and third of the normalising assumptions in CBTp noted in the 
introduction. 
 
Challenging Un-Understandability:  Applying “Normal” Psychological Theories to 
Explain “Abnormal” Beliefs 
Researchers in this third tradition have attempted to understand the development 
and maintenance of ostensibly delusional beliefs by drawing on the conceptual frameworks 
and research methods used in studies of the general population within psychology’s sub-
fields like perceptual, cognitive and social psychology.  Garety and Freeman’s (2013) review 
of cognitive behavioural research on delusions, for example, reviewed studies examining 
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biases in probabilistic reasoning (e.g. the “jumping to conclusions” bias), externalising 
attributions, affective processes and appraisal.  Freeman (2006, p.202) concludes his review 
of non-clinical studies of “delusions and delusional ideation” by noting that “these 
experiences are not outside of understanding in terms of interactions of normal (albeit 
biased or dysfunctioning) processes” and he argues that, as a result, intervention with CBT 
is justified. 
Studies within this tradition, therefore, have challenged traditional psychiatric 
assumptions that “delusional” beliefs are “un-understandable” (Jaspers, 1963) or “empty 
speech acts” which are “not the symbolic expression of anything” (Berrios, 1991, p.12).  In 
contrast, Roberts (1991) reported that they were associated with measures of purpose and 
meaning in life and might offer a “preferred reality” and researchers have investigated a 
range of possible meanings. 
One line of research has examined associations between the content of ostensibly 
delusional beliefs and adverse life experiences.  For example, Read et al. (2003) reported a 
link between documented abuse in childhood or adulthood and the thematic content of 
supposedly delusional statements.  Persecutory beliefs have been associated with 
attachment-disrupting events (e.g. Bentall et al., 2014), childhood adversity and experiences 
both of victimisation (e.g. Dickson et al., 2016) and discrimination -- Janssen et al’s (2003) 
large-scale general population study found that a higher level of “delusional ideation” was 
associated with experience of discrimination, particularly in two or more domains (e.g. 
gender, skin colour or ethnicity etc).  Researchers in these studies draw on a range of 
hypotheses derived from “normal” psychological theories, particularly cognitive theory, to 
explain these links, thus warranting the fourth normalising assumption noted in the 
introduction.   
The normalising programme has thus made a successful challenge to traditional 
psychiatric assumptions about beliefs labelled as delusional, breaking down the dichotomy 
between “abnormal” and “normal” belief; in James’ (1911) terms, familiarising the strange.  
However, as I argue in the next section, the potential of this programme to reconceptualise 
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these beliefs has been hampered by a number of limitations, many of them similar to 
critiques of cognitive behavioural approaches (e.g. Boyle, 2002; Parker et al., 1995). 
Six Limitations of the Normalising Research Programme 
1. Medicalisation and Pathologisation 
Many studies within this programme frame the beliefs and experiences of general 
population participants within a medical conceptual framework, indicated by describing non-
clinical samples as “sub-clinical”, “psychotic-like”, “schizotypal” and “not in need of care.”  
Such terminology reifies and homogenises the participants in both clinical and non-clinical 
groups, implicitly undermining the programme’s challenge to the assumption of a qualitative 
difference between the groups.  In addition, a psychiatric discourse of risk and vulnerability 
means that the beliefs and experiences of the general population can be transformed from 
aspects of human variation (e.g. Romme & Escher, 2012) into indicators of the “risk” of 
future “psychosis.”  This can exacerbate the current problems of creeping medicalisation like 
the broadening of diagnostic categories, lowering of diagnostic thresholds and “disease 
mongering” (the creation of new categories of disorder for problems of living previously 
understood in non-medical terms).  Whilst spectrum approaches like the continuum model 
hold out the possibility of an appreciation of the diversity of what we understand as “normal,” 
at the same time they can also enable increasing portions of the general population to be 
seen as “abnormal” and “at risk.”   As McGuire (2014, p.407, emphasis in original) notes we 
move from asking “not ‘is disorder present or absent?’ but rather ‘how much disorder is 
present?’”  
2.  Decontextualisation  
A second problem is the reliance – with notable exceptions like Heriot-Maitland et al 
(2012) – on quantitative methods like diagnostic interview schedules and self-report 
measures.  The reification of questionnaire responses as “beliefs” means that we are not 
given any contextual detail which might help us understand them or understand the 
relationship between belief claims and conduct nor do we know how the person themselves 
might verbalise their belief claim in everyday conversation.  For example, if a NRM member 
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scores highly on the PDI we do not know whether they looked for a group which shared their 
beliefs or whether the item resembles a key religious or spiritual belief of that community 
which they have adopted since joining it.  With studies using diagnostic interview schedules 
we lack contextual information about how raters judge a person as being “in need of care.”   
3.  A Problematic Focus on the Individual and the Intra-Psychic 
A third problematic feature of the normalising programme is that it has tended to 
locate the cause of distress as lying within the individual – seen as a unitary rational subject 
(Harper, 1996; Parker et al., 1995) -- with less of an emphasis on the person’s relational 
context. Yet, as Berkhout et al (2019) note, even the “self-disorders” associated with 
psychosis diagnoses are decidedly relational.  The variables investigated in the normalising 
programme are usually measures of intra-psychic (e.g. cognitive, affective etc) constructs or  
demographic data on individuals.  NRMs are often simply seen as a source of “healthy” non-
clinical participants but the belief community itself, the relationships within it and members’ 
relationships with people outside it (e.g. with family, friends, work colleagues etc) are not 
considered.  Moreover, there has been little, if any, systematic empirical investigation of the 
dynamic responses, over time, of the social networks of members of a range of belief 
communities.  In one of the few empirical studies of paranoia in the context of interpersonal 
relationships over time, Edwin Lemert (1962), drew on data gathered in a study of mental 
health service users, their families and the courts system in the US.  He documented how 
problems developed, observing that families initially tolerated “paranoid” behavior until the 
situation deteriorated leading to a crisis point, after which those around the person began to 
respond differently to them.  Cameron (1943) noted how a person’s paranoid preoccupations 
might cause them to react towards others in a manner that might lead others to exclude 
them, thus creating what he termed a paranoid “pseudo-community” (1943, p.233).  Yet, 
studies like Lemert (1962) and Kaffman’s (1981) family therapy case studies were 
conducted decades ago and there has been little further longitudinal empirical investigation 
of social network responses.  This is surprising since how those in a person’s social network 
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become concerned about their beliefs is a crucial element in the process by which they may 
be referred for assessment of their mental health.   
4.  The Neglect of Power and the Discursive and Institutional Context 
As already noted, studies in the normalising programme often involve diagnostic 
interviews (e.g. prevalence studies) or utilise clinical samples where people have been given 
psychiatric diagnoses thus, to some degree, implying the validity of diagnostic categories 
despite their inherent problems (e.g. Boyle, 2002).  Of particular concern here is the lack of 
attention given to the interactional process of judging a belief to be delusional and the role of 
the diagnoser’s assumptions (Harper, 2011).  Spitzer has proposed that such a judgement is 
prompted when a person makes “statements about external reality which are uttered like 
statements about a mental state, i.e. with subjective certainty and incorrigible by others” 
(Spitzer, 1990, p.391).  Palmer (2000) has drawn on the work of Woofitt (1992) who 
observed that, when ordinary people talk about paranormal experiences, they tended to 
preface their reports with a description of a mundane activity, which might suggest to the 
hearer that what the person was about to report was to be understood as strange and out of 
the ordinary.  Palmer argued that people judged to hold delusional beliefs failed to do this.  
McCabe’s (2004) conversation analysis of psychiatric interactions concluded that a failure to 
persuade was key, arguing that her sample of service users could “recognize that others do 
not agree with their delusional claims and are not persuaded by the justification they provide 
for these claims” but that, despite this, “they do not revise their claims” (McCabe, 2004, 
p.738).     
However, Spitzer and McCabe implicitly assume that people go about making “non-
delusional” belief claims in a different manner whilst Palmer (2000) makes this assumption 
explicit but bases it on only one study of a non-clinical belief community.  Yet there is 
evidence of incorrigibly held beliefs amongst a range of belief communities like political 
groups (Billig, 1991).  Moreover, as Heise (1988) observes, we need to focus not only on the 
role of the person making belief claims but the other party in the interaction -- the diagnoser 
or interviewer -- and the asymmetrical power relations in psychiatric interviews where the 
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professional has the socially sanctioned power to infer the beliefs of the service user and to 
act as an arbiter of belief plausibility. Indeed, Berkhout et al (2019) argue that at least some 
apparently pathological phenomena may result from such power asymmetries.   
In discourse analytic studies, Georgaca (2000, 2004) has examined transcripts of her 
own interviews with service users considered to hold delusional beliefs.  She argues that her 
position as a research interviewer could be viewed as institutionally analogous to that of a 
diagnostic interviewer and that such institutional positions grant authority to question the 
belief claims of psychiatric service users and for them often to accept such questioning.  She 
also observes that the judgement of delusion arises from a clash of competing interpretive 
frameworks, for example, for beliefs with religious content, between a secular medical 
framework and a religious one (Georgaca, 2004).  She concludes that “delusions … employ 
culturally available discourses and discursive strategies for their construction” and “that they 
are argued and negotiated in speech with similar strategies to those used by ‘non‐delusional’ 
individuals” (Georgaca, 2000, p.227).   
The interactional context of diagnosis is often obscured by the way diagnoses are 
presented as an unproblematically objective categorisation but interviews with diagnosers 
can illuminate it. Harper (1994), for example, observed that psychiatrists and psychologists 
drew not only on an “empiricist” account but also a “contingent” account of diagnosis.  For 
example, when explaining disagreement with their colleagues over the correct diagnosis for 
a service user they might discuss their theoretical preferences and those of their colleagues.  
Unsurprisingly, given the subjectivity involved in diagnosis there is evidence that biases may 
affect judgements (Harper, 2011). In one of the few studies to examine diagnosers’ 
assumptions about beliefs, O’Connor and Vandenberg (2005) found that clinicians rated 
core beliefs of the US Nation of Islam, but not Mormon and Catholic beliefs, as pathological.  
In another study, O’Connor and Vandenberg (2010) reported that psychology 
undergraduates appeared to evaluate whether beliefs were pathological on the basis of how 
similar they were to their own beliefs.  Summarising the results of both studies, O’Connor 
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and Vandenberg (2010, p.181) concluded that “ratings of psychopathology are based on the 
conventionality of the beliefs”.   
5.  Neglecting the Cultural Context of Belief 
Many of the problems so far identified could be seen as reflecting particular cultural 
assumptions and this brings us to the fifth limitation:  the neglect of the cultural context of 
beliefs.  The assumption of a unitary rational subject is one example of this and Berkhout et 
al (2019, p.460 argue that the Eurocentric “bounded, unified self of presumed ‘health’ and 
‘normality’ is distinctly a product of specific gendered, racialized, classist, and ableist 
presumptions”.  The psychiatric terminology utilised in normalising programme research is 
steeped in Western dualistic conceptions like the distinction, adopted by the DSM, between 
beliefs and sensory experiences yet Jones and Luhrmann (2016) report that many of their 
interviewees gave accounts of “auditory hallucinations” which involved a blend of thought 
and sensory perception.  Similarly, the role of the body is de-emphasised although accounts 
of distress often seem to be referring to feelings (i.e. embodied affective states) rather than 
disembodied cognitions (Cromby & Harper, 2009).  In addition, affect (i.e. “distress”) is seen 
as a separable dimension from cognition in measures like the PDI.  Following Jaspers 
(1963) a distinction is also made between the form and content of symptoms.  Finally, DSM 
disorders are presented as culturally universal but potentially expressed differently in 
different cultural contexts and DSM-5’s categories of delusion content (e.g. persecutory, 
grandiose etc) are treated similarly.  Finally, researchers within the normalising programme 
have not examined how individual beliefs might be influenced by the changing cultural 
availability of particular ideas nor is there much consideration of how such changes might 
lead to changes in the cultural acceptability or “social currency” (Heise, 1988, p.886) of 
beliefs, an issue which is likely to affect the extent to which beliefs are shared by others. 
6.  Inattention to Epistemic Injustice 
A sixth and final limitation of studies in the normalising programme is that they have not 
investigated the experience of what philosopher Miranda Fricker has termed “epistemic 
injustice” (Fricker, 2007).  Fricker (2007, p.1) describes two forms of such injustice: 
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• testimonial injustice: whereby “prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of 
credibility to a speaker's word.”  
• hermeneutical injustice:  which “occurs at a prior stage, when a gap in collective 
interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to 
making sense of their social experience.”  
 
Sanati and Kyratsous (2015) note that, because of prejudicial stereotypes about people 
with psychiatric diagnoses, a service user may find their credibility is questioned.  An 
example of such testimonial injustice can be seen in cases of the “Martha Mitchell effect” 
(Maher, 1988) where clinicians, because of such stereotypes, judge a belief as delusional 
when it is not.  Maher named such cases after the late wife of President Nixon's Attorney 
General John Mitchell.  Because she gave journalists information about the Watergate affair, 
the Nixon White House attempted to undermine her by labelling her as unreliable due to 
alcoholism and mental health problems.  However, the information she gave journalists was 
later confirmed in the subsequent investigations.  Yet, as Sanati and Kyratsous (2015) note, 
the veracity of all a service user’s statements, not simply those related to a supposedly 
delusional belief, may be questioned.  Harper (2011) suggests that, in diagnosing paranoia, 
professional judgements of the plausibility and credibility of accounts may be influenced by 
the service user’s status in relation to social categories of identity like gender, “race,” culture 
and social class and that there is the potential for a double injustice since women, black 
people and those from a working-class background not only are more likely to experience 
structural discrimination but more likely, in general, to have their credibility questioned.  
Sanati and Kyratsous (2015) suggest that hermeneutical injustice may arise when a belief is 
seen as delusional because the service user cannot find the language to adequately convey 
their concerns in some way or because mental health professionals lack the conceptual 
resources to understand what is being communicated.  Hermeneutical injustice will be 
exacerbated by power asymmetries in the process of diagnosis and also when there is an 
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inequality of access either to non-pathologising explanations for anomalous experiences or 
to the kinds of belief communities where such accounts might be found – they may, for 
example, be more available to those with higher levels of education.    
These limitations have prevented the normalising programme from fully realising the 
potential of general population research to reconceptualise how beliefs labelled as 
delusional are understood.  In James’ (1911) terms, these normalising studies could be 
characterised as a programme of familiarising the strange.  However, by not fully 
investigating the diversity of belief in the general population, this programme has failed to 
view the “familiar as if it were strange” (James, 1911, p.7).  In the next section I make a case 
for the importance of social norms in the process of judging beliefs as delusional and 
propose the study of a range of unconventional belief communities.  In the final section I 
suggest ways in which such studies could address each of the six problems with the 
normalising programme.  
 
Seeing “the Familiar as if it Were Strange”:   
Unconventional Belief Communities and the Breaching of Social Norms 
 
The Importance of Social Norms in Judging Beliefs as Delusional 
The DSM-5 includes this glossary definition of delusion:   
 
A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly held 
despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes 
incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not 
ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture (i.e., it is 
not an article of religious faith).  
 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.819) 
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Psychiatric diagnoses are normative and we can see that this definition implies 
several assumptions about “non-delusional” beliefs.  For example, it is assumed that they 
will be: of a propositional nature, true and based on correct inference about external reality 
and that each of these can be straightforwardly determined.  There is an extensive literature 
debating the validity of this definition on conceptual and empirical grounds (e.g. Boyle, 2002; 
Oltmanns, 1988; Spitzer, 1990) but here I will focus on its empiricist assumptions.  Maher 
(1992, p.261) has argued that the judgement that a belief is delusional is “typically made by 
a clinician on the basis of ‘common sense,’ and not on the basis of a systematic evaluation 
of empirical data”.  This claim is consistent with observational studies of assessment 
interviews showing that psychiatrists frequently elicit the content of beliefs, less frequently 
challenge the content or explore alternative explanations, but do not appear to examine the 
evidence for beliefs in any systematic manner (Zangrilli et al., 2014).  Perhaps one of the 
reasons why such examination does not occur is that, as Georgaca has argued, ostensibly 
delusional beliefs “are statements about the self and the world whose truth and falsity cannot 
be definitely settled in speech” (2000, p.227).  In practice, it seems that whether a person’s 
beliefs are shared by others and whether they have been able to persuade others of their 
beliefs are key concerns (Boyle, 2002; Heise, 1988).  As Oltmanns (1988) puts it “[t]he 
balance of evidence for and against a belief is such that other people consider it completely 
incredible” (Oltmanns, 1988, p.5, emphasis added).   
 
General Population Research as a Corrective to the “Clinician’s Illusion”  
One of the central challenges of psychiatry is that although its central constructs, like 
delusions, are defined in normative terms, clinicians and researchers lack comparative data 
on the general population since the vast majority of their work is with people who have been 
referred to mental health services.  As a result, they can fall prey to the “clinician’s illusion” 
(Cohen & Cohen, 1984) whereby they overgeneralise from their clinical experience to the 
general population.  Thus, on the basis of their clinical experience seeing service users 
whose beliefs are associated with distress and disruption, they might presume that such 
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beliefs are inherently pathological.  I would argue that the DSM-5 definition is influenced by 
this bias since it was not formulated on the basis of empirical data about “non-delusional” 
beliefs in the general population.  For example, many beliefs widely endorsed in the general 
population may lack persuasive empirical evidence:  a Gallup survey of 1002 US adults 
reported that 73% believed in at least one of ten paranormal experiences with 41% believing 
in extrasensory perception and 37% believing that houses could be haunted (Moore, 2005).  
There is, therefore, a danger that those holding beliefs considered delusional are being held 
to a higher standard of rationality -- a hyper-rationality – than ordinary people. 
The study of general population samples can provide a corrective to this bias and 
Boyle (2013) suggests four ways in which such research can be useful.  Firstly, experiences 
and behaviour seen as associated with “psychosis” can be understood in the context of 
“normal” responses to “abnormal” events like the range of adversities which people can face 
in their lives (e.g. childhood abuse, bullying etc).  Secondly, she suggests there is a need to 
identify links between apparently “psychotic” experiences and other “normal” experiences 
distributed in the general population (i.e. that they can be understood by drawing on similar 
principles and theories).  For example, Bentall (2015, p.114) argues that “psychotic” 
experiences should not be compared with ordinary life experiences but, rather, with “the 
exceptional experiences of ordinary people” like “sudden life changes such as religious 
conversion” (p.114).  Thirdly, researchers could investigate the wide range of functions (e.g. 
personal, interpersonal, social and cultural) which “psychotic” experiences and beliefs might 
fulfil in the same way as other experiences and beliefs fulfil functions.  Lastly, she suggests it 
is important to explore links between the content of “psychotic” experiences and beliefs and 
a range of life experiences, for example, with adverse experiences.  To some degree, the 
normalising research programme has made forays into these areas but, as we saw in the 
previous section, it has been hampered by a number of limitations.  However, building on 
Boyle’s (2002) arguments, if normative judgements about beliefs are key, but these 
judgements might be subject to bias because of a focus on clinical groups, then one way 
forward is to develop a systematic programme of research on groups in the general 
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population whose beliefs may be seen as implausible because they breach a range of 
socially established belief norms.   
 
Examining the Role of Social Norms by Researching Unconventional Belief 
Communities 
We saw earlier how normalising programme studies identified sub-groups within the 
general population whose beliefs were seen, on theoretical grounds, to share some features 
with beliefs labelled as delusional with the most studied groups being religious and spiritual 
belief communities like New Religious Movements.  The alternative programme proposed 
here is different in two respects.  Firstly, the identification of groups should be focused on 
the breaching of social norms.  Secondly, building on studies like O’Connor and Vandenberg 
(2010), the range of groups studied should be expanded to include members of a range of 
communities whose shared beliefs are seen as unconventional which I will refer to as 
unconventional belief communities (UBCs).  The Cambridge free English dictionary defines 
“unconventional” as “different from what is usual or from the way most people do things” 
(Cambridge University Press, n.d.).  “Unconventional” and related synonyms like “unusual,” 
capture the way in which the belief claims of members of UBCs are likely to challenge the 
norms of conventional society in a number of different ways. For example, they might appear 
strange, difficult to understand or explain, different from what is normal or expected, out of 
the ordinary and either not conforming with or deviating from what is seen as normal.  A 
focus on the unconventionality of belief opens up the range of belief communities which 
could be studied including sub-groups within mainstream religious faiths, like evangelical 
Christians who might hear the voice of God (e.g. Luhrmann 2012), groups studied within the 
fields of parapsychology and anomalistic psychology (e.g. Murray & Wooffitt, 2010) like 
mediums within the Spiritualist church (e.g. Roxburgh & Roe, 2014) and people claiming to 
have been abducted by extra-terrestrials (e.g. Clancy, 2005) as well as those endorsing a 
range of political beliefs including conspiracy beliefs (Harambam, 2020).  UBCs could be 
identified on theoretical grounds by selecting beliefs and belief communities which might 
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breach a particular norm for example those implied by definitions of delusions or in 
descriptions of categories of content. 
Although quantitative research can be useful in investigating patterns in larger 
groups there is also a need for more qualitative work (e.g. Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012; 
Murray & Wooffitt, 2010; Roxburgh & Roe, 2014) including ethnographic work (e.g. 
Harambam, 2020; Luhrmann 2012).  However, although there will be significant overlaps 
between ordinary ethnographic work on these topics and this alternative programme, the 
questions focused on by researchers might be those which would lead to a richer 
understanding of the kinds of distressing and disruptive beliefs which prompt referral to 
mental health services.  As well as asking some different questions they might also draw on 
different conceptual resources (e.g. Critical Disability, Post-Colonial and Mad Studies 
perspectives). 
In the next and final part of this argument alternative research questions and study 
designs are proposed for the investigation of lived belief narratives in context through a 
programme of research focused on UBCs in the general population. 
 
From Normalising “Psychosis” to De-Familiarising “Normality”: 
Studying the Lived Belief Narratives of Unconventional Belief Communities in Context 
 
1. A Demedicalising and Non-Pathologising Approach 
It is essential that researchers studying UBCs do so by using a non-medical 
conceptual framework and terminology.  For religious and spiritual UBCs there are well-
established conceptual frameworks within the fields of theology, sociology and anthropology 
(e.g. Dein et al., 2012; Luhrman, 2012).  Within psychology, researchers have suggested 
alternative terminology like “anomalous experience”, “non-ordinary experience” or 
“exceptional experience” (Lynn, 2017).  A challenge here is that different research traditions 
utilise different concepts, terminology and methods and thus there is a need for detailed 
descriptions of beliefs.  In addition, UBC members may be understandably wary that mental 
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health researchers might pathologise them or seek to “de-bunk” their beliefs and thus it will 
be important to approach these communities in a respectful manner.  Mental health 
researchers, including psychiatric survivor researchers, could work collaboratively with 
members of these communities, theologians, anthropologists and sociologists, seeking to 
understand the community’s beliefs in a more ethnographic manner, within the milieu of the 
particular group.  Rather than simply contrasting their beliefs and experiences with 
psychiatric categories, a focus on social norms might provide a less pathologizing way of 
framing research questions.  Beginning with the assumption that unconventional beliefs and 
experiences are not inherently problematic might enable us to understand why some 
people’s beliefs become so overwhelming and distressing or so disruptive that they cause 
them or others concern. 
2. Understanding Lived Beliefs in Context 
 An important aspect of a UBC programme of research will be to provide not only rich 
but contextualised descriptions of people’s beliefs.  These descriptions might include 
information on the meaning of the belief to the person and how it is integrated into their life 
both inside and outside of the community as well as the relationship between belief claims 
and the belief system shared within the community.  Thus Haramabam’s (2020) study of 
conspiracy beliefs considers the influence of personal biographies, the conspiracy milieu as 
well as broader cultural shifts in wider society.  In other words, a UBC programme should 
focus on beliefs as they are lived.  In addition, as Boyle (2002, 2013) suggests, attention 
could be paid to the range of functions which beliefs serve.  For example, both paranoid and 
conspiracy beliefs are associated with a range of adversities like powerlessness and 
victimization (e.g. Freeman & Bentall, 2017) and Cromby and Harper (2009) have described 
how such adversities, pattered by social inequality, can lead to an embodied paranoid 
stance toward the world.  The British Psychological Society’s Power Threat Meaning 
Framework (Johnstone & Boyle, 2018) hypothesises that beliefs and experiences regarded 
as “symptoms” within a medical framework could, instead, be seen as adaptive “threat 
responses”, coping strategies developed as a response to the threats posed by a range of 
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adversities resulting from the unequal operations of power in society.  An alternative 
programme could examine belief-related threat responses in the general population, 
investigating links between them and life adversities as well as a range of functions.  Such 
studies could examine particular UBCs whose members are likely to have experienced 
adversities and also groups within the population likely to have experienced certain 
adversities rather than UBCs per se.  For example, Grier and Cobb (1968/1992) argued that 
it was necessary for African-Americans to develop a “’healthy’ cultural paranoia” (1992, 
p.161) in order to survive living in a racist society.  However, such research also needs to 
attend to the ways in which such intelligible and adaptive responses to social inequality have 
been historically pathologized.  Metzl (2010), for example, has documented the way in which 
African-American men, expressing legitimate concerns about racism have, historically, been 
seen as “hostile” and “aggressive” and given schizophrenia diagnoses.   
It is also possible to examine the belief dimensions of conviction, preoccupation and 
distress in a more contextualised manner (Boyle, 2002; Georgaca, 2000). Boyle (2002) has 
hypothesised that the “conviction” with which an idiosyncratic belief is held may be 
associated with whether a person, because of their life circumstances, is threatened by the 
“loss” of a belief and that there might be less preoccupation when a belief is not rejected by 
others but shared by them and integrated into a person’s day-to-day life.  Peters et al (1999) 
found high ratings of conviction amongst their NRM participants but less preoccupation and 
one possibility is that belief conviction was rated highly because the PDI items endorsed 
were core beliefs of the NRM.  Was there less preoccupation because the beliefs were 
shared within the NRM and integrated into their lives?  More ethnographic research with 
UBC members might shed light on such questions.  Boyle (2002) also hypothesises that a 
person holding idiosyncratic beliefs might be distressed not only because the content 
concerns threat from others but also, if the content is positive, because others respond 
negatively, for example, not being persuaded that the belief is true.  Peters et al (1999) did 
not find high ratings of distress amongst their NRM sample and, again, qualitative research 
with UBC members might help us understand distress in a more contextualised manner. 
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3. Studying the Interpersonal Context 
The study of the interpersonal context of belief would be greatly helped by more 
research into how a wide range of beliefs in the general population are negotiated within 
families and other social networks.  This would provide a comparative basis for the study of 
UBC members’ social networks.  Researchers could examine whether UBC members 
discuss their beliefs with people outside the belief community and, if so, how they respond.  
In Roxburgh and Evenden’s (2016) study of people with anomalous experiences they 
reported that others often responded negatively: “whenever I’ve ever spoken about my 
experiences, people have, think that I’m barmy, that I’m a bit mad” (p.215).  Roxburgh and 
Evenden observed that, as a result, they were dissuaded from talking to other people about 
them.  It is possible, therefore, that many UBC members, aware of how their beliefs might be 
seen by others, do not discuss them or, at least, are careful about who they share them.  As 
a result it is possible that they do not, therefore, cause others concern and thus avoid 
coming to the attention of mental health services.   
Lemert’s (1962) study suggests that families may have a high threshold of tolerance 
for unconventional beliefs and it would be useful to explore whether this is the case across a 
wide range of UBCs.  Do, for example, family members and friends of UBC members 
disagree with their beliefs?  Or do they tolerate, accept or even agree with them?  What 
influences these processes and how do they evolve over time?  How often do family 
members and others become concerned by the beliefs of UBC members and what prompts 
such concerns?  For example, if there are concerns, is it the person’s beliefs per se or their 
impact on the person’s life and others which give rise to them?  And, for those considered 
“eccentric,” who may not have significant social networks, have they managed to avoid 
coming into contact with mental health services and, if so, how? 
Interpersonal relationships within the belief community could be another topic of 
interest.  A range of UBCs could be studied including those which are more structured (e.g. 
with a defined belief system, a consistent membership and perhaps regular in-person 
meetings) and those which are more of a network, perhaps only existing online with little 
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direct contact except through discussion forms.  Members of faith groups often report the 
importance of fellowship and social support from fellow believers (Mankowski & Rappaport, 
2000) and it is likely that many UBC members will have similar experiences.  Moreover, 
within some UBCs certain beliefs and experiences might be validated and valorised rather 
than pathologized.  Thus, within the Spiritualist movement clairaudient mediums are seen as 
having a gift (Roxburgh & Roe, 2014).  Researchers could examine the way in which group 
members are given such valued social roles and how they are experienced – for example 
what is it like both for those feeling they are able to contact deceased loved ones through a 
medium and those who are seen as having such a gift? 
4.  Studying Discourse, Power and Pathologisation 
Studying how members of a range of UBCs draw on different discursive strategies to 
make and defend their belief claims could help explore the questions raised by Georgaca, 
Heise, McCabe, Palmer and Spitzer.  For example, Bennett and Bennett’s (2000) qualitative 
study showed that bereaved people who experience a sense of the continuing presence of 
their deceased loved one drew on both “materialist” and “supernaturalist” discourses in 
describing their experiences, sometimes within the same sentence.  Similarly, in a study of 
people with psychosis diagnoses, Jones et al (2016, p.442) found that their participants 
“weighed and debated competing secular and supernatural explanations, often juxtaposing 
and blending different explanatory frameworks.”  Although Jones et al (2016) hypothesized 
that this negotiation might be heightened for those with psychosis diagnoses, Bennett and 
Bennett’s (2000) study suggests this might be a more common experience and so further 
study of this amongst members of UBCs would be useful.  Moreover, Bennett and Bennett 
(2000) reported that people were often reluctant to espouse a supernaturalist discourse, 
particularly with strangers, “for fear of ridicule” (p.141) illustrating the powerful role of social 
norms in influencing whether beliefs are disclosed as noted in the previous section. 
Obviously, since UBC members are not located in mental health institutions, they are 
not subject to the same power asymmetries as service users, like the socially sanctioned 
power of a professional to label their beliefs as delusional.  However, lay people, too, make 
 24 
insanity ascriptions as O’Connor and Vandenberg’s (2010) study of undergraduates shows.  
Indeed, as Coulter (1973) suggests, such lay ascriptions may form the basis for the more 
technical judgements made by professionals.  Lay judgements could, therefore, be a focus 
for researchers in the UBC research programme and it is noteworthy that the terms used to 
refer to those with unconventional beliefs (e.g. “weirdo”, “nut”, “crank” etc) are similar to the 
kinds of derogatory terms for mental health service users.  Do others consider UBC 
members’ beliefs as simply strange and unconventional or do they view them as 
pathological and indicative of psychiatric problems?  What might influence such 
judgements?  To what extent are people outside of UBCs persuaded by their belief claims 
and by what criteria do they judge the plausibility of such claims?  Do they, for example, 
make judgements about falsity, basis in reality and the extent to which beliefs are viewed as 
culturally shared?  In a Q methodology study of how a general population sample judged the 
plausibility of conspiracy beliefs, Lauren Daniel and I found that, whilst a dominant account 
focused on conventional scientific criteria for evaluating evidence and the quality of 
reasoning, heuristics like expert consensus were also important across the accounts whilst 
some accounts emphasised the importance of assessing the credibility of information 
sources (Daniel & Harper, 2020). 
As we have seen, a key social norm is the extent to which a belief is shared by 
others and this could be investigated in different ways.  For example, one could research 
UBCs with smaller and those with larger numbers of members.  One could also study a 
range of UBC beliefs:  those which are shared by a larger proportion of the general 
population and those shared by smaller proportions as indicated by general population 
survey data.  For example, in relation to beliefs about extra-terrestrials, Patry and Pelletier 
(2001) reported that 48% of their Canadian student sample believed in UFOs but only 25% 
believed in alien abductions.  Clancy’s (2005) study of people reporting alien abduction 
experiences draws on a similar methodological and conceptual framework to studies in the 
normalising programme but includes a number of potential avenues for qualitative work.  An 
even rarer belief is “that shape-shifting reptilian people control our world by taking on human 
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form and gaining political power to manipulate our societies” – it was endorsed by only 4% in 
a US survey (Public Policy Polling, 2013, p.3).  Interviewing people holding this “reptilian” 
belief, propounded by conspiracy author David Icke (Harambam, 2020), would provide an 
insight into what it is like holding a belief shared by very few. 
Coulter (1973) suggested that beliefs might be regarded as unusual but still be seen 
as legitimate and socially supported if they were categorised as religious beliefs or 
superstitions so researchers could examine the differential social support for a range of 
UBCs assessed, for example, via opinion polls and media reporting.  UBCs may be 
represented in a range of ways in the media (e.g. as harmless and even entertaining or, on 
the other hand, as dangerous).  Thus, whilst some religious and spiritual beliefs might 
receive the legitimacy Coulter suggests, some NRMs are labelled as dangerous “cults”.  
Similarly, conspiracy beliefs vary in how much support they attract.  For example, Drochon 
(2018) reports that 55% of British adults polled in 2015 agreed with the statement, “[t]he 
Government is deliberately hiding the truth about how many immigrants really live in this 
country.”  However, reptilian beliefs are endorsed by fewer people.  Thus some conspiracy 
beliefs more than others may be regarded as “stigmatized knowledge” because those 
endorsing them do so “despite the marginalization of those claims by the institutions that 
conventionally distinguish between knowledge and error” (Barkun, 2003, p.26).  Many 
conspiracy believers are aware of how negatively they may be perceived and often reject the 
label “conspiracy theorist” because they view such labelling as an attempt to de-legitimise 
their beliefs (Harambam, 2020).   
Coulter observed that, outside of socially supported beliefs, other beliefs might be 
seen as falling within a category of “bizarre idiosyncrasy” (1973, p.136) and Roberts (1991, 
p.21) notes that whereas political and religious belief systems may be shared with fellow 
believers “the person committed to a delusional world view is strikingly alone”.  But the social 
category of “eccentric” can be ascribed to people whose views are so idiosyncratic they do 
not belong to an identifiable community.  For example, Weeks and James (1997) 
interviewed over a thousand people they defined as eccentrics because they were “non-
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conforming”; “happily obsessed with one or more hobbyhorses”; and “convinced that he [sic] 
is right and that the rest of the world is out of step” (1997, p.18).  What might prompt a 
judgement that a person is not simply eccentric but mentally ill?  Researchers could 
investigate whether those considered eccentric have been labelled in such a way, whether 
they have tried and failed to persuade others of their beliefs or whether they have simply not 
been concerned to discuss them with others. 
5.  Studying the Relationship Between Individual and Cultural Narratives  
In order to explore the relationship between beliefs and culture it may be helpful to 
draw on a conceptual framework which avoids individualistic cognitivist terms like “belief.”  In 
the folklore research tradition the term “belief narrative” is used to refer to the way in which 
“individuals and communities verbalise and communicate” about “mysterious phenomena” or 
“supernatural experiences” as well as the “various interpretations and beliefs connected with 
such experiences” (Hiiemäe, 2016, p.8).  The narrative metaphor has been used by 
researchers working at individual, interactional and ideological and cultural levels of analysis 
(Murray, 2000) and by scholars from different psychotherapeutic traditions, within the 
survivor movement and across cultures.  It could thus provide a way of integrating both 
different levels of analysis and different theoretical traditions.  Narratives can be viewed as 
not inherently pathological but as potentially adaptive whilst viewing them as embodied and 
lived can avoid unhelpful distinctions between belief and experience.   
A broadly narrative perspective also opens up questions about the availability and 
acceptability of the broader cultural narratives which shape our beliefs.  For example, Jones 
et al (2016, p.402) discuss the ways in which the rise of a post-secular cultural shift is 
associated with an “embrace of a complex understanding of what is real that neither accepts 
nor rejects the supernatural”. They also note the availability of new virtual communities and 
Bell et al (2006) and Shullenberger (2017) have described the flourishing online sub-cultureiii 
devoted to beliefs about “mind control” with members claiming they are “targeted Individuals” 
who are victims of “gang-stalking.”   These beliefs are thematically similar both to earlier 
notions of “influencing machines” (Jay, 2012; Shullenberger, 2017) and to the DSM-5 
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description of delusions “of being controlled” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  The 
experience of such virtual communities could be explored since they might not only enable 
people, who might otherwise be socially isolated, to find others with similar experiences 
across national boundaries but also expose people to sceptics which might heighten their 
awareness of cultural tensions and doubt (Jones et al., 2016). 
Sheridan et al (2020) estimate the prevalence of “gang-stalking” belief as up to 
0.17% of adult men and 0.66% of adult women whilst, in a recent US survey, 15% endorsed 
the belief that “media or the government adds secret mind-controlling technology to 
television broadcast signals” (Public Policy Polling, 2013, p.3).  Researchers could 
investigate the way in which “targeted individual” belief narratives relate to broader cultural 
narratives.  Shullenberger (2017) argues that they engage with public concerns about 
government and commercial surveillance technologies, journalistic and Congressional 
investigations into research by intelligence agencies as well as popular culture. The internet 
is a key vector for the circulation of such narratives and Shullenberger (2017) notes that, 
whereas, previously, information in the media might pass through a filter of interpretation by 
experts (e.g. mental health professionals), digital media flatten culturally sanctioned 
hierarchies of expertise.  They have also facilitated a process of “mainstreaming” by which 
conspiratorial explanatory narratives have moved from the cultural margins to the 
mainstream (Barkun, 2013).  The hypertextuality of the World Wide Web means that a 
website on one topic can easily link one to other conspiratorial topics, and the 
recommendation algorithms serve a similar function for other digital media (e.g. Youtube 
videos), leading to the increased cultural availability of previously marginal narratives.  
Popular culture like the X-Files TV series (1993-2002) also contribute to this mainstreaming, 
meaning that conspiratorial explanations have become destigmatised over time (Barkun, 
2013).  The increasing cultural availability of previously marginal narratives is also facilitated 
by broader cultural changes.  Thus Aupers (2012) links the rise of both conspiratorial beliefs 
and New Age spiritual beliefs with a search for meaning in response to growing societal 
epistemological and ontological insecurity.  The relationship between the availability and 
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cultural acceptability of beliefs merits further study.  Is acceptability simply an effect of 
availability?  For example, Jenkins (2000, p.231) notes new religious groups have gradually 
become accepted over time and thus “the cult oddities of the 1920s became the religious 
orthodoxies of the 1990s.”   
6.  Addressing Testimonial and Hermeneutical Injustice 
As with the issue of pathologisation, whilst a UBC research programme would not 
necessarily directly focus on the experiences of service users, it could still shed light on 
epistemic injustice.  For example, to what extent do UBC members experience testimonial 
injustice and how is it influenced by UBC members’ social locations (e.g. gender, social 
class, ethnicity etc)? Moreover, UBCs vary in their demographic composition and the 
influence of this on perceptions of credibility and pathology could be examined.  For 
example, O’Connor and Vandenberg (2005) expressed concern that clinicians rated the core 
beliefs of the US Nation of Islam as pathological because this is an exclusively African-
American organisation.  Thus experiences of testimonial injustice could be explored with 
members of UBCs comprised exclusively or predominantly of people subject to 
discrimination (e.g. women, working class people, and people from a range of ethnic, sexual 
and other minorities etc) and compared with UBCs whose members come from more 
privileged backgrounds. 
Researchers might investigate hermeneutical injustice by exploring how people 
encounter UBCs and whether awareness of -- and access to -- them is influenced by their 
economic, social and cultural capital.  Might it also be the case that some beliefs are 
adopted because people have been deprived access to other kinds of explanatory narratives 
because of inequalities of educational opportunity?  For example, might conspiracy beliefs, 
associated as they are with a range of adverse circumstances and lower levels of education 
(Freeman & Bentall, 2017), as well as a country’s level of inequality (Drochon, 2018), 
function as an attempt to explain injustice in a context where people have not had access to 
other explanatory frameworks which could have rendered opaque and abstract political and 
structural forces more intelligible? 
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Discussion 
I have focused on the normalising research programme both because of its 
association with CBTp -- which has become increasingly well-established -- and because 
general population research could provide an important corrective to the assumptions 
implicit in definitions of delusional belief.  However, as discussed in a recent report from the 
British Psychological Society there are a number of non-medical approaches to 
understanding “psychotic” beliefs and experiences and a range of interventions including not 
only CBTp but also self-help and community alternatives (Cooke, 2017).  Yet because of the 
focus here on the normalising research programme associated with CBTp, other bodies of 
work, alternative research strategies and potential interventions have necessarily been given 
less emphasis.  The international Hearing Voices Movement (HVM), for example, offers an 
alternative perspective on voice-hearing and unusual beliefs viewing them as “human 
variations that need emancipation and freedom of mind” (Romme & Escher, 2012, p.1).  The 
HVM accepts the validity of cognitive models alongside a range of other explanatory models 
(e.g. spiritual, trauma-based, libertarian, psychodynamic etc) and offers peer-support groups 
which allow people to develop their own understanding of their experiences, rather than 
psycho-education about cognitive models as in group CBTp.   
I am not arguing that the UBC programme outlined here will address all the questions 
of importance to those searching for ways to understand and support those experiencing 
distressing and/or disruptive beliefs.  There is, of course, important work to be done 
exploring the experience of those with distressing beliefs (as well as those close to them) 
and examining interactions with professionals, particularly research examining diagnosers’ 
own assumptions.  Future studies could be informed by critical work, including by psychiatric 
survivor researchers, drawing on theoretical resources within Critical Disability, Post-
Colonial and Mad Studies (e.g. Berkhout et al., 2019; Jones et al., 2016; Liebert, 2018).  
Indeed, bringing these perspectives to bear on UBCs in the general population could lead to 
a mutually productive cross-fertilisation of ideas and, potentially, to a much more 
fundamental reconceptualization of the notion of “delusion.”   
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i It can be challenging to write about psychiatric categories and constructs like “psychosis” and “delusion” without 
reifying them.  Authors sometimes signal their contested status by placing them in inverted commas but the 
meaning of this can be ambiguous and it can be distracting to readers.  Throughout this article I have used 
phrasing which emphasises that such terms are judgements -- often contested -- made by professionals and not 
neutral descriptions (e.g. I refer to people having psychosis diagnoses rather than being “psychotic”).  Such 
terms have been retained where I am referring to the psychiatric construct, where they are part of the name for a 
model or therapy or where authors have used them.  Where appropriate, I place them in inverted commas to 
signal that their use can obscure the underlying conceptual problems of these categories. 
 
ii The term “psychosis” refers to a broad range of diagnoses like schizophrenia and bipolar disorder where a key 
issue is that the person’s beliefs and experiences are considered to depart from consensual reality.  However, it 
is subject to the same kinds of conceptual and ethical problems as the category of schizophrenia (Boyle, 2002, 
2013). 
 
iii Of course, as Bell et al (2006) note, the existence of such communities sharing beliefs, rated by the 
psychiatrists in their study as “delusional,” provides another challenge to the cultural sharing criterion in 
definitions of delusion. 
 
